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Abstract
We consider a model in which each worker endogenously selects his own type through a
private investment decision and selects a public signal in the labor market. Signaling then
contributes to social welfare through its inuence on the quality choice. We o¤er a rationale
for the argument that there are too many high-type workers from a welfare perspective,
identifying circumstances under which separating equilibrium generates too many high-type
workers while having to use the incentive-compatible signal and treat high-type workers
di¤erently in the market. The ine¢ ciency can then be reduced in pooling equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
We consider a situation in which a seller makes a private investment to endogenously determine
the quality of the product that the seller provides in a competitive market. The consequent
asymmetric information in the market in return causes a moral hazard problem in the investment
stage: given a single price in the market, sellers have no incentive to make the investment that
would upgrade the quality. In the setting, signaling contributes to social welfare through its
inuence on the quality choice. The no-investment problem can be solved by separating signal,
because sellers can then be treated di¤erently in the market, and by pooling signal as well,
because sellers can then reduce signaling costs even when they are treated equally in the market.
In this paper, we formalize the setting using a labor-market model in which each worker
endogenously selects his own type through a private investment decision and then selects a
public signal in the market.1 In the model, the worker decides whether to make the investment
and become high type, or to remain as low type, by comparing the future benet that will be
manifested through signaling with the investment costs that are drawn from a prior distribution
of workers inborn cost types. An equilibrium consists of a proportion of workers who make
the investment to be high type, and a signaling form. The proportion of high-type workers
in the population is referred to as the investment ratio, and the signaling takes the form of
either separating or pooling. We raise the question: can we rationally say that there are too
many high-type workers from a welfare perspective? The answer is not obvious because the
workersselection of types is made in their interests. In separating equilibrium, some workers
choose to become high type for their own benets while causing no welfare loss to the remaining
workers. Thus, with the use of separating equilibrium alone, we cannot argue that there are too
many high-type workers, even when most of workers make the costly investment to be treated
di¤erently from a very small fraction of the remaining workers.
We show, however, that there exist circumstances under which separating equilibrium gen-
erates too many high-type workers from a welfare perspective. The use of pooling equilibrium
is essential for the nding due to the accompanying feature: pooling signal a¤ects all workers
and entails a tension between the generation of high-type workers and the signaling costs of low-
type workers. In particular, we use a subtle link between pooling and separating equilibrium to
identify conditions under which we can make the following statements: (i) for any separating
equilibrium, there exists a pooling equilibrium that approximates the separating equilibrium in
1Although we adopt a familiar labor-market model in this paper, our main theme can be generally extended
for the setting in which an investment decision endogenously generates asymmetric information in the market,
and asymmetric information in the market in return causes the moral hazard problem in the investment stage.
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terms of the investment ratio and social welfare; (ii) this pooling equilibrium has overinvestment;
and (iii) there exists an optimal pooling equilibrium that restricts the ine¢ ciency of overinvest-
ment. We nd that three statements hold under a single condition: pooling signal reaches a
saturation pointsuch that it becomes su¢ ciently ine¤ective in generating the investment ratio
above a certain equilibrium level. Under the condition, the tension observed in pooling signal
implies that it is socially preferred to reduce signaling costs than to increase high-type workers.
In this case, separating equilibrium generates too many high-type workers while still having to
use the incentive-compatible signal and treat high-type workers di¤erently in the market. The
ine¢ ciency of overinvestment can then be reduced in pooling equilibrium where workers use the
same signal without having to be treated di¤erently. On the other hand, there also exist circum-
stances under which pooling signal remains su¢ ciently e¤ective in generating the investment
ratio further. In this case, pooling equilibrium generates too few high-type workers, and the
ine¢ ciency of underinvestment can be reduced in separating equilibrium.
In practice, it is commonly argued in the mass media that there are too many college grad-
uates typically based on limited job openings. It is, however, di¢ cult to support the argument
perhaps for two main reasons. First, despite limited job openings, high school graduates may
choose to go to college for their own benets. Indeed, there exists a signicant wage gap between
college-educated and high-school-only workers in real data.2 Second, a fundamental question of
whether and how the signal (college degree) contributes to human capital is rarely discussed or
answered in the argument.3 In regard to the specic issue, our model broadly indicates that,
despite the signicant wage gap, if the capacity for education to increase the aggregate human
capital reaches a saturation point over the education level between high school and college, then
it becomes reasonable to argue that signaling costs of college degree are too high, and there are
too many college graduates, from a welfare perspective.
Our model is related to a few existing models. Fang (2001) contains an investment stage
before workers select signaling, and highlights an economic role of social cultureby showing
2The college wage premium substantially increased between 1980 and 2005 in the US, and it has been studied
by a vast body of literature (see, for example, Taber (2001), Fang (2006), Goldin and Katz (2007a, 2007b), Walker
and Zhu (2008) and Cunha, Karahan, and Soares (2011) among many others).
3Since the classical papers of Spence (1973, 1974), the information-conveyingaspect of signaling has produced
a large body of literature (see Kreps and Sobel (1994) and Riley (2001) for literature survey). The information-
conveying aspect of education has also been empirically tested (Wolpin (1977), Riley (1979), Lang and Kropp
(1986), Tyler, Murnane and Willett (2000), Bedard (2001)). For example, using a unique data set containing the
General Educational Development (GED) test scores, Tyler, Murnane and Willett (2000) identify the signaling
value of the GED, net of human capital e¤ects. They observe that there are substantial signaling e¤ects for young
white dropouts, estimated at about 20% earnings gain after 5 years.
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that there exists a separating equilibrium in which the seemingly irrelevant activity, social cul-
ture, becomes an endogenous signaling instrument for the workers who invested in skills. In his
model, however, pooling equilibrium is inferior to separating equilibrium in which workers make
the investment to be treated di¤erently. Using a signaling setting in which the market (receiver)
observes an informative grade in addition to the regular signal, Daley and Green (2014) show
that some degree of pooling emerges in equilibria and that, if the markets prior belief that the
sender is high type approaches one, then the equilibrium converges to the complete-information
outcome, pooling with no costly signaling. In their discussion of the possibility that there is an
ex ante privately-observed investment, they predict that the investment remains ine¢ ciently low
even in the presence of informative grades given that it takes additional resources to be treated
di¤erently as high type. In our model, the receivers belief is endogenously supported only if
signaling is large enough to support the belief. We nd that there are important welfare impli-
cations that have not been observed by the existing information-conveying argument, showing
that signaling may overly generate high-type workers.
Recent papers by Hermalin (2013) and Kawai (2014) consider a situation in which an in-
vestment in an asset made by a seller endogenously determines the value of the asset, and a
potential buyer cannot observe the sellers investment decision made prior to trade. In those
models, there is a key trade-o¤ between the provision of ex ante incentive for investment and
the achievement of ex post e¢ ciency in trade: if trade is sure to happen, then the seller has no
incentive to invest ex ante, and if no trade is anticipated, then the seller has incentive to invest
for her own benet. In equilibria, investment and trade occur both with a positive probability
when the buyer cannot observe the sellers investment, or receive any signal of it. In particular,
Hermalin (2013) observes that a holdup problem arises when the buyer has all the bargaining
power and the problem may cause overinvestment. Our model also establishes the existence of
overinvestment when an ex ante investment results in asymmetric information between sellers
and buyers, but it allows that signaling is a natural option for sellers and that trade surely
occurs in a competitive market.4
This paper is organized as follows. We introduce the model in Section 2, and provide the
existence of separating and pooling equilibria in Section 3. In Section 4, we o¤er a rationale
for the assertion that there may be too many, or too few, high-type workers from a welfare
4Goldlücke and Schmitz (2014) consider an ex ante investment as well, but in a di¤erent context where a
seller can make an observable investment to improve his product specialized for a buyer, showing that a sellers
signaling motive can alleviate the ex ante underinvestment (i.e., the hold-up problem). A key insight of their
model is that if the seller has private information about the fraction of the ex post surplus that he can realize on
his own, then his large investment can serve as signal of having the strong outside options that a¤ect the buyers
take-it-or-leave-it o¤er.
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perspective. We provide numerical examples in Section 5, and concluding remarks in Section 6.
All the proofs are collected in an appendix.
2 Model
We explore a situation in which each worker determines his own quality of labor through a
private investment decision, and this endogenous quality choice causes asymmetric information
in the market. We consider signaling to be a natural option for workers, and reveal a notable
feature of the model implied by the endogenous quality choice.
2.1 Endogenous quality choice and signaling
We consider a labor market that has a unit mass of workers. Each worker has an inborn
investment cost level c, which is drawn from an absolutely continuous distribution function G(c)
with the support [c; c], where c > c  0. The level of c captures a composite cost depending on
the individual workers aggregate endowment such as intellect, health, maturity, initial wealth,
and parental environment. The density g  G0 is everywhere positive. Given the inborn cost,
each worker makes an endogenous choice of his own type q 2 fH;Lg, and this choice is privately
observed. The choice of q = L needs no investment and the choice of q = H needs an investment
that incurs the inborn cost. A worker next selects a publicly observable signal e 2 R+ in the labor
market where two risk-neutral rms engage in a Bertrand-type competition with simultaneous
wage o¤ers. The worker earns wage w 2 R+ if he is hired by one of the two rms and has zero
utility from outside options. Thus, a worker who selects type q has the type-dependent payo¤(
uq (w; e)  c if q = H
uq (w; e) if q = L;
where uq (w; e) is strictly increasing in w and strictly decreasing in e. A rm obtains the value
yq 2 R+ when it employs a worker with type q 2 fH;Lg. The workers investment improves the
value, yH > yL.
The utility function uq (w; e) is continuous and includes the following standard assumptions.
The Spence-Mirrlees property (SMP) holds in the function. Formally, an increase in signal is




  uH (w; e) > uL  w; e0  uL (w; e) . (1)
In addition, we assume that uq (w; e) has no cross e¤ectbetween q and w. In other words,




  uH (w; e) = uL  w0; e  uL (w; e) . (2)
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This assumption greatly simplies our analysis and is satised for all separable utility functions,
uq (w; e) = v(w)   cq (e), for any increasing function v (). For no signal e = 0, it is reasonable
to assume that the level of utility is type-irrelevant:
uH (w; 0) = uL (w; 0) : (3)
This assumption and SMP imply uH (w; e) > uL (w; e) for all e > 0.
The time line is described as follows:
Time 1. Nature chooses c.
Time 2. Each worker chooses type q.
Time 3. Each worker chooses signal e.
Time 4. The two rms simultaneously make wage o¤ers.
Time 5. Each worker accepts the highest wage and produces. For indi¤erent o¤ers, he
randomly selects one rm.
The workers investment strategy at time 2 is a mapping Q : [c; c]! fH;Lg, and the workers
signaling strategy at time 3 is a mapping E : fH;Lg ! R+. A worker makes the investment
decision by comparing the investment cost with the benet that will be manifested through the
signaling choice. As we present below, the equilibrium investment strategy Q takes the form
of a cuto¤ strategywith a threshold cost type k such that workers who are endowed with
cost type c < k (c > k) make the investment (no investment). An equilibrium is called an
interior equilibrium if it has the threshold on an interior point of the support [c; c], k 2 (c; c),
and an equilibrium is called a boundary equilibrium otherwise. The strategy of rm i at time 4
is a mapping wi : R+ ! R+ for i = 1; 2. Each rm observes signal e and forms the (common
posterior) belief  (e), the probability of q = H. Given the Bertrand-type competition, in
equilibrium, each rms strategy satises w (e) = wi (e) =  (e) yH + (1   (e)) yL for all i.
A strategy prole f(Q (c) ; E (q)); w (e)g is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium if in each time line,
the strategy of each player is the best response to the other playersstrategies, and the belief is
updated by the Bayesrule where possible.5
5Formally, a set of strategies f(Q (c) ; E (q)); (wi (e))2i=1g and a belief function  (e) constitute a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium if
(i) (Q (c) ; E (q)) is optimal for the worker given (wi (e))
2
i=1;
(ii)  (e) is derived from E (q) via the Bayesrule where possible;
(iii) (wi (e))
2
i=1 is a Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous move game in which both rms make wage o¤ers to
the worker knowing that q = H with probability  (e).
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2.2 Separating and pooling equilibria
We characterize two interior equilibria, separating and pooling. We begin by analyzing the
signaling stage at time 3. For separating equilibria, let eH  E (H) 6= eL  E (L). The Bayes
rule entails that  (eH) = 1 and  (eL) = 0 on the equilibrium path; thus, yH (yL) becomes
the wage for high-type (low-type) workers, and low-type workers maximize utility by selecting
eL = 0. For pooling equilibria, let e  E (H) = E (L). The Bayesrule entails that  (e) =  on
the equilibrium path, where  denotes the proportion of high-type workers; thus, the expected
value E [y] = yH + (1  ) yL becomes the wage for both types. The proportion of high-type
workers, , is endogenously determined by the workersinvestment decision.
Separating and pooling equilibria must satisfy incentive compatibility conditions:
uH (yH ; eH)  uH (yL; 0) and uL(yL; 0)  uL(yH ; eH),
and
uH(E [y] ; e)  uH (yL; 0) and uL(E [y] ; e)  uL(yL; 0).
A separating signal eH must be in an interval, eH 2 [eH ; eH ], where eH and eH are respectively
dened by binding constraints,
uH (yH ; eH) = uH (yL; 0) and uL (yL; 0) = uL(yH ; eH), (4)
with eH > eH > 0 from the assumption uL (yL; 0) = uH (yL; 0). A pooling signal e must be in
an interval, e 2 [0; e()], where the upper bound e () is dened by the binding constraint
uL(E [y] ; e ()) = uL(yL; 0). (5)
There is no overlap in the use of signal in two equilibria, e () < eH , for all  < 1.
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Consider next the investment stage. For separating equilibria, if a worker selects q = H,
then he has utility uH (yH ; eH)  c, and if a worker selects q = L, then he has utility uL (yL; 0).
Hence, in the investment stage, an interior separating equilibrium has a threshold:
ks = uH(yH ; eH)  uL(yL; 0). (6)
For pooling equilibria, if a worker selects q = H, then he has utility uH(E [y] ; e)   c, and if
a worker selects q = L, then he has utility uL(E [y] ; e). Hence, in the investment stage, an
interior pooling equilibrium has a threshold:
kp = uH(E [y] ; e)  uL(E [y] ; e).
6For  < 1, we have e () < eH from uL(yH ; eH) = uL(yL; 0) = uL(E
[y]; e()) and yH > E [y].
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Since the utility gain from wage increase is type-irrelevant by the assumption in (2),
uH(E [y] ; e)  uL(E [y] ; e) = uH(0; e)  uL(0; e),
a threshold kp is given as
kp = uH(0; e)  uL(0; e). (7)
It follows from (6) that an increase in separating signal eH discourages workers from becoming
high type while causing no welfare loss to the workers who remain as low type. An increase in
pooling signal e a¤ects all workers, and it is immediate from (7) and SMP in (1) that an increase
in e encourages workers to become high type.
Lemma 1 The separating threshold ks is a strictly decreasing function of eH 2 [eH ; eH ], whereas
the pooling threshold kp is a strictly increasing function of e 2 [0; e ()].
We now dene interior and boundary equilibria. An interior separating equilibrium is dened
as a pair (ks ; eH) that satises
ks = uH (yH ; e

H)  uL (yL; 0) 2 (c; c) and eH 2 [eH ; eH ]. (8)





kp = uH (0; e







where the proportion of high-type workers in the population, G(kp), is endogenous.
In a boundary equilibrium, workers are treated equally by the same wage and thus they select
no costly signal, e = 0. Given that workers are treated equally and select no signal, we have
uH (w; 0)  uL (w; 0) = 0 from the assumption in (3) and nd that workers have no incentive to
make the investment. Thus, the boundary equilibrium with no investment can solely survive.
Lemma 2 A unique boundary equilibrium (kb ; e

b) exists with G(k

b ) = e

b = 0.
In the model, there can be two types of interior equilibria, separating and pooling, and
there is a unique boundary equilibrium. We henceforth restrict attention to non-trivial interior
equilibria; in what follows, a separating (pooling) equilibrium refers to an interior separating
(pooling) equilibrium.7
7 In our analysis below, the boundary equilibrium with no investment is considered only under the ban on
signaling.
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2.3 Signaling as socially benecial device
We now highlight a notable feature of the model: signaling contributes to social welfare through
its inuence on the workersselection of types. The ban on signaling (no signaling) leads to a
pooling equilibrium in which workers receive the same wage and thus select no signal, and given
uH (w; 0)  uL (w; 0) = 0, workers make no investment. Therefore, the ban on signaling results
in the boundary equilibrium with social welfare uL (yL; 0). If the ban on signaling is lifted, then
the no-investment problem can be solved. In a separating equilibrium with eH , the workers with
c 2 (c; ks) select high type to be treated di¤erently with a higher wage yH , uH (yH ; eH)   c >
uL (yL; 0), while the remaining workers have utility uL (yL; 0). In a pooling equilibrium with e,
although all workers are treated equally by the same wage, the workers with c 2 (c; kp) select
high type to reduce signaling costs, uH
 
E [y] ; e
   uL(E [y] ; e) = uH (0; e)   uL (0; e) > c,
while the remaining workers have utility uL(E [y] ; e)  uL(yL; 0).
Lemma 3 In our model, any separating or pooling equilibrium generates a strictly higher welfare
than the ban on signaling.
We in turn show that signaling becomes socially wasteful with no inuence on the workers
selection of types. To this end, we consider a benchmark model in which the proportion of
high type is exogenously xed at  2 (0; 1). In any pooling equilibrium with e > 0, the ban on
signaling benets all workers who receive the same wage E [y] regardless of their types. In the
separating equilibrium with eH , the ban on signal benets low-type workers since uL(E[y]; 0) >
uL(yL; 0), and it benets high-type workers only if  is su¢ ciently large to satisfy uH(E[y]; 0) >
uH(yH ; eH). As we show in the Appendix, the concavity of uL ensures that the benet of low
type is greater than the loss of high type even for small .
Lemma 4 In the benchmark model, (i) the ban on signaling generates a strictly higher welfare
than any pooling equilibrium with e > 0; and (ii) if uL is concave in w, then the ban on signaling
generates a strictly higher welfare than any separating equilibrium.
3 Existence of equilibria
In this section, we establish the existence of separating and pooling equilibria. We assume that
uq is di¤erentiable in what follows.
We proceed to examine the separating equilibrium with the least costly signal eH that satises
Cho-Krepscriterion (Cho and Kreps (1987)). Since the threshold ks is strictly decreasing in
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eH 2 [eH ; eH ], the separating equilibrium with eH has the highest level ks,
ks = uH (yH ; eH)  uL (yL; 0) = uH(yH ; eH)  uL(yH ; eH),
where the second equality follows from the denition of eH , uL (yL; 0) = uL (yH ; eH) in (4).
Given the assumption that the utility gain from wage increase is type-irrelevant, the threshold
becomes
ks = uH (0; eH)  uL(0; eH). (10)
We now adopt two useful notations. First, we dene a function
(e)  uH (0; e)  uL (0; e)
to capture how signal e determines the type-relevant gain that workers expect when making the
investment. Notice that, for any pooling signal e and the separating signal eH , we can use the
same function  to represent investment thresholds:8
kp = (e) and ks = (eH):
Second, we dene a distribution function
D(e)  G( (e))
to examine how signal e generates the proportion of high-type workers in the population that is
hereafter referred to as the investment ratio. The function D(e) is strictly increasing in pooling
signal e 2 [0; e ()] for all D(e) 2 (0; 1). The slope D0 (e) is su¢ ciently steep (at) if an increase
in pooling signal e is su¢ ciently e¤ective (ine¤ective) in increasing the investment ratio further.
For instance, the slope D0(e) = g((e)) 0(e) may be steep (at) for e  e, if the population
density g(c) is high (low) for c  (e), and (or) if the magnitude of 0(e) is large (small) for
e  e.9
We next use those functions, (e) and D(e), and establish the existence of equilibria. There
exists a separating equilibrium with eH if and only if (eH) 2 (c; c), or equivalently D(eH) 2
(0; 1). In the separating equilibrium, the signal eH motivates the workers with cost types below
ks = (eH) to make the investment and results in the investment ratio D(eH) = G((eH)).
We also establish the existence of a pooling equilibrium using the correspondence
fx 2 [0; 1] : x = D (e) for e 2 [0; e ()]g: (11)
8Note that  captures the type-relevant gain net of income e¤ect. We also know that pooling signal cannot
exceed the level eH and that the separating signal eH has the feature in (10). Thus, for any pooling signal and
the separating signal eH , we can use the same function .






Figure 1: Two intervals of equilibrium proportions
The correspondence has the maximum value D (e ()) = G ( (e ())) for the highest pooling
signal e () given . The following proposition shows that there exists a pooling equilibrium
with some e 2 [0; e ()] if and only if the function D (e ()) reaches the 45 degree line for some
 2 (0; 1). This existence condition means that, given  2 (0; 1), the highest pooling signal e ()
motivates the workers with cost types below kp = (e ()) to make the investment and results
in the investment ratio D(e ()) becoming at least as high as .
Proposition 1 (i) There exists a separating equilibrium with eH if and only if (eH) 2 (c; c),
or equivalently D (eH) 2 (0; 1).
(ii) There exists a pooling equilibrium if and only if D (e ())   for some  2 (0; 1).
Figure 1 depicts the case with two sets of equilibrium proportions, [0; 1] and [2; 3],
where the dotted area below the curve D(e()) represents the correspondence in (11). Since
uL(E [y] ; e ()) = uL(yL; 0) where E [y] = yL + (yH   yL), the highest signal e () is strictly
increasing for all  2 (0; 1) with boundary values, e (0) = 0 and e (1) = eH . Thus, using the
same function  for interior and boundary values, we can nd that (e ()) is strictly increasing
for all  2 (0; 1) with (e (0)) = 0 and
(e (1)) =  (eH) = ks,
and that D(e()) is strictly increasing for all D(e()) 2 (0; 1) with the vertical intercept
D(e(1)) = D(eH) = G(ks).
If the wage gap, yH   yL, becomes larger given yL, then D(e()) shifts up since e() increases
given  > 0. The function shifts more if the gain from making the investment, (e), is larger.
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In the following proposition, we impose a condition on the slope of D(e()): the slope is
su¢ ciently small such that a pooling equilibrium exists and generates the investment ratio that
approaches D(e(1)). If (e(1)) > c, then the condition immediately holds: if (e(1)) > c, then
D(e()) is perfectly at on the top, D(e()) = 1 on [0; 1] for some 0 2 (0; 1), and thus a
pooling equilibrium exists and generates the investment ratio that approaches 1. As we conrm
in Section 5, the condition on the slope of D(e()) plays a key role in our justication for the
assertion that there are too many high-type workers for a welfare perspective.
Proposition 2 (i) If (e (1)) > c, then there exists a pooling equilibrium with  su¢ ciently
close to 1.
(ii) Suppose c < (e (1))  c. If there exists a su¢ ciently small 0 > 0 such that dD (e ()) =d




, then there exists a pooling equilibrium. In addition, if
dD (e ()) =d converges to zero, the investment ratio in the pooling equilibrium converges
to D (e (1)).
Notice that the slope of D(e()) depends on the slope D0(e) = g((e)) 0(e). The condition
on the slope of D(e()), stated in Proposition 2 (ii), is likely to hold if the wage gap, yH   yL,
is su¢ ciently large given yL so that D(e()) is above 45 degree line for some , and an increase
in pooling signal e is ine¤ective in increasing the investment ratio so that the slope D0(e) is
su¢ ciently at above a certain level.
4 Too many (too few) high-type workers
In this section, we o¤er a theoretical foundation of the argument that there are too many,
or too few, high-type workers from a welfare perspective. For this purpose, we say that the
government uses the regulation (E) (the regulation (E)) if it imposes a lower bound E (an
upper bound E) on the use of signal. We then associate the regulation (E) (the regulation (E))
with circumstances under which the government promotes (restricts) the generation of high-type
workers to maximize social welfare.
4.1 Regulation
We here show that the government can use the regulation (E) or (E) to support a particular
equilibrium as a unique equilibrium satisfying the Cho-Krepsintuitive criterion. Suppose that
the government uses the regulation (E) such that a pair (ks ; eH) = (uH(yH ; E)  uL(yL; 0); E)
satises (8) and thus is a separating equilibrium. Then the pair becomes a unique equilibrium
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that satises the Cho-Krepsintuitive criterion, since there is no signaling below E to which a
type H worker can deviate, and there exists no pooling equilibrium given that pooling signal
e must satisfy e < eH  E = eH .10 Suppose next that the government uses the regulation
(E) such that a pair (kp; e) = (uH(0; E)   uL(0; E); E) satises (9) and thus is a pooling
equilibrium. Then the government can support the pair as a unique equilibrium that satises
the Cho-Krepsintuitive criterion, since there is no signaling above E to which a type H worker
can deviate, and there exists no separating equilibrium given that separating signal eH must
satisfy eH > e()  e = E. The following lemma reports this nding.
Lemma 5 For any separating (pooling) equilibrium, the regulation (E) (the regulation (E)) can
support the separating (pooling) equilibrium as a unique equilibrium that satises the Cho-Kreps
intuitive criterion.
The government can also a¤ect the workersselection of signal and investment through its
tax policy. Formally, for any separating (pooling) equilibrium, there is a tax policy under which
the separating (pooling) equilibrium satises the Cho-Krepsintuitive criterion. A key idea is
that the government can impose a tax on the signal above e (below eH) if it implements a
pooling (separating) equilibrium with e (eH), and the level of tax is determined to prevent the
potential deviation by high-type workers.11 To deliver our main ndings simply, we focus on the
regulation (E) or (E) in this paper.
4.2 Tension in pooling
We now express social welfare in terms of investment while observing that workers have surplus





[uH (yH ; eH)  c]dG(c) +
Z c
ks
uL (yL; 0) dG(c)




where the second equality follows from ks = uH (yH ; eH) uL (yL; 0). The social welfare consists
of two parts: the utility uL (yL; 0) that is secured for all workers and the surplus of investment
10 If (e(1))  c, or equivalently D(e(1)) = 1, then the separating equilibrium with eH = eH does not exist, but
a separating equilibrium with eH 2 (eH ; eH ] may exist. Our nding implies that if a separating equilibrium with
eH 2 (eH ; eH ] exists, then the regulation (E) can support it as a unique equilibrium that satises the Cho-Kreps
intuitive criterion.
11The proof for this result can be provided upon request.
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that is available only for the workers with cost types below ks. Integrating by parts, we can
rewrite Us (ks) as








[uH(E [y] ; e)  c]dG(c) +
Z c
kp
uL(E [y] ; e)dG(c).
Using kp = uH(E [y] ; e) uL(E [y] ; e) and integration by parts, we nd that the social welfare
consists of the utility uL(E [y] ; e) that is secured for all workers and the surplus of investment
that is available only for the workers with cost types below kp:
Up (kp) = uL(E [y] ; e) +
Z kp
c
G(c)dc; where  = G (kp) and e =  1 (kp) . (13)
Having Us (ks) and Up (kp), we can analyze the relationship between social welfare and in-
vestment. In a separating equilibrium, an increase in the workers investment unambiguously





when eH = eH . In a pooling equilibrium, by contrast, an increase in kp has a trade-
o¤: an increase in kp raises the expected wage and the surplus of investment, but it increases
signaling costs of workers who remain as low type,




















where 1=0(e) follows from the inverse function e =  1(kp). Thus, pooling signal a¤ects all
workers and entails a tension between the generation of high-type workers and the signaling
costs of low-type workers. To relate this feature to ndings in the following subsection, we
here identify the conditions on g(kp) and 0 (e) under which Up (kp) is strictly decreasing in kp.
Notice that the conditions remain valid for any wage gap, yH   yL.
Lemma 6 In a pooling equilibrium, if g(kp) or 0 (e) is su¢ ciently small (large) at e =  1 (kp),
then Up (kp) is strictly decreasing (increasing) in kp.
4.3 Distortions in investment
We nally ask the main question: can we rationally say that there are too many high-type
workers from a welfare perspective? In a separating equilibrium, the workers with lower cost
types make the investment to receive a higher wage while causing no welfare loss to the remaining
13
workers. Indeed, the social welfare Us(ks) strictly increases in ks. Therefore, with the use of
separating equilibrium alone, it is impossible to assert that there are too many high-type workers,
even when most of workers make the costly investment to be treated di¤erently from a very small
fraction of the remaining workers.
We nd, however, that there exist circumstances under which there are too many high-type
workers. The use of pooling equilibrium is essential for this nding due to the accompanying
tension between the generation of high-type workers and the signaling costs of low-type workers.
We begin by recalling that the separating equilibrium with eH has the social welfare:




From (12) and (13), we also nd the di¤erence in the social welfare:




where uL(E [y] ; e)  uL (yL; 0)  0 with equality only if e = e() from (4).
Suppose now that (e(1)) 2 (c; c), or equivalently, D(e(1)) 2 (0; 1). Then there exists the
separating equilibrium with eH that has the the investment ratio G(ks) = D(e(1)). Denote this
investment ratio by   G(ks) = D(e(1)). We next impose a condition on the slope of D(e):
the slope D0(e) is su¢ ciently at for e  e  e () such that a xed point  = D(e())




p)  Us(ks) = uL(E







G(c)dc < 0. (16)
The condition on the slope D0 (e) leads to two points. First, kp approaches ks and thus Up(kp)
approaches Us(ks). Second, the pooling equilibrium with e has overinvestment, since the con-
ditions on g(kp) and 0 (e) reported in Lemma 6 imply that the social welfare Up(kp) is strictly
decreasing in kp whenD0 (e) = g ( (e))0 (e) is su¢ ciently small. Thus, the condition on D0 (e)
means that there is kp such that kp < kp and Up(kp ) is greater than Us for any separating
equilibrium. If (e (1)) = c, then a similar result can be obtained. Lastly, if (e (1)) > c, even





, and the same conclusion follows. Once a superior form of signaling is identied, the
social planner can implement the optimal policy based on Lemma 5.
Proposition 3 (i) If (e(1)) > c, then the regulation (E) maximizes social welfare.
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(ii) Suppose c < (e(1))  c. Given D(e(1)) > 0, if there exists a su¢ ciently small 0 > 0 such
that the slope D0 (e) is su¢ ciently small on

e : D (e) = ,  2 0; 1	, then the regulation
(E) maximizes social welfare.
In summary, in the parameter range where c < (e (1))  c, due to the restriction on
the slope D0(e), we can make the following statements:12 (i) Proposition 2 ensures that, for
any separating equilibrium, there exists a pooling equilibrium that approximates the separating
equilibrium in terms of the investment ratio and social welfare; (ii) Lemma 6 implies that this
pooling equilibrium has overinvestment; and (iii) it follows from Proposition 1 and Lemma 6
that there exists an optimal pooling equilibrium that restricts the ine¢ ciency of overinvestment.
Therefore, there exist circumstances under which there are too many high-type workers from
a welfare perspective.13 Intuitively, the condition on D0(e) corresponds to a situation in which
pooling signal has a saturation point such that it becomes su¢ ciently ine¤ective in generating
the investment ratio above a certain equilibrium level. Under the condition, the tension observed
in pooling signal implies that it is socially preferred to reduce signaling costs than to increase
high-type workers. In this case, separating equilibrium generates too many high-type workers
while still having to use the incentive-compatible signal and treat high-type workers di¤erently
in the market. The ine¢ ciency of overinvestment can then be reduced in pooling equilibrium
where workers use the same signal without having to be treated di¤erently.
We can also identify circumstances under which there are too few high-type workers from a
welfare perspective. If the slope of D (e) is su¢ ciently steep for some range, then it is uncertain
that a pooling equilibrium exists, and even when a pooling equilibrium exists, it may generate
too few high-type workers. To formalize this argument, suppose (e(1)) 2 (c; c). Given G(ks) =
D(e(1)) 2 (0; 1), if  that satises  = D(e()) is su¢ ciently smaller than D(e(1)), then the
term uL(E

[y] ; e) in (16) approaches uL (yL; 0), but kp does not approach ks. Then Us(ks) is
greater than Up for any potential pooling equilibrium. This condition corresponds to a situation
in which pooling signal remains su¢ ciently e¤ective in generating the investment ratio further.14
In this case, there are too few high-type workers in pooling equilibrium, and the ine¢ ciency of
12 If (e(1)) > c, then a pooling equilibrium exists with its investment ratio approaching D(e(1)) that cannot be
achieved by any separating equilibrium. Thus, we exclude this parameter range when arguing that the ine¢ ciency
of overinvestment can be reduced in pooling equilibrium.
13The ine¢ ciency of overinvestment may be reduced in pooling equilibrium, kp < ks and Up(kp) > Us(ks), even
when the slope of the function D (e ()) is moderately small.
14 If (e(1)) = c, then the separating equilibrium with eH does not exist, but the regulation (E) can support
a separating equilibrium with eH > eH that approximates the investment ratio D (e (1)). Thus, the result in
Proposition 4 holds when (e (1)) = c.
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underinvestment can be reduced in separating equilibrium. The following proposition reports
this nding.
Proposition 4 Suppose c < (e(1))  c. Given D(e(1)) > 0, if the maximum  that satises
 = D(e()) is su¢ ciently smaller than D(e(1)), then the regulation (E) maximizes social
welfare.
5 Numerical examples
In this section, we use numerical analysis and report circumstances under which the ine¢ ciency
of overinvestment can be reduced in pooling equilibrium, kp < ks and Up(kp) > Us(ks).
We use the utility function, uq (w; e) = w   cq (e) for q 2 fL;Hg, where cL (e) = e2 and
cH (e) = ae
2 for a 2 (0; 1). Then, kp = (e) = uH(0; e)   uL(0; e) = (1   a)e2. From
uL(E [y] ; e ()) = uL (yL; 0), we have e() =
p
B, where B denotes the wage gap, B  yH yL.
From uL(yL; 0) = uL(yH ; eH), we nd eH =
p
B = e(1) and ks = (eH) = (1 a)B. We consider
an exponential CDF:
G (c; ) =
1  e c
1  e  , c 2 [0; 1] and  > 0.
We then have
D(e) = G ( (e) ; ) =
1  e (1 a)e2
1  e  and D(e ()) =
1  e (1 a)B
1  e  :

















For a xed ks = (1  a)B = 0:6, Proposition 3 indicates that, if (1  a) is su¢ ciently small, or
if the exponential parameter  is su¢ ciently large, then there exists a pooling equilibrium that













Table 1. Fixed point values
(1  a) B ks  D(e (1))  kp
0:6 1 0:6 3 0:8784 0:8055 0:5458
0:3 2 0:6 3 0:8784 0:8055 0:5458
0:2 3 0:6 3 0:8784 0:8055 0:5458
0:3 2 0:6 2 0:8082 0:5797 0:4334
0:3 2 0:6 3 0:8784 0:8055 0:5458
0:3 2 0:6 4 0:9262 0:9016 0:5798
For e = e(), uL(E



















1  a = 0, and Up
 
kp
  Us  ks < 0.
However, for (1  a) su¢ ciently small, there exist pooling equilibria with kp < kp and Up (kp) 
Us(ks) > 0. Table 2 reports this result.
Table 2. Change in (1  a)
(1  a) B ks  Up(kp)  Us(ks) Up(kp)  Us(ks) for kp = 0:3
0:6 1 0:6 3  0:1087  0:1066
0:3 2 0:6 3  0:1707 0:0180
0:2 3 0:6 3  0:2327 0:1425
Figure 2 illustrates the outcomes when (1   a) decreases (i.e., 0(e) = 2(1   a)e decreases)
while holding ks = (1  a)B and  xed. The function D(e ()) then remains the same, but
the di¤erential Up(kp)   Us(ks) shifts up on [0; kp] and results in Up(kp)   Us(ks) > 0. Table
3 reports that for the exponential parameter  su¢ ciently small, there exist pooling equilibria
with kp < kp and Up(kp)  Us(ks) > 0.
Table 3. Changes in the exponential parameter
(1  a) B ks  Up(kp)  Us(ks) Up(kp)  Us(ks) for kp = 0:3
0:3 2 0:6 2  0:2276  0:1602
0:3 2 0:6 3  0:1707 0:0180
0:3 2 0:6 4  0:1143 0:1717
Figure 3 illustrates the outcomes when  increases. An increase in  shifts G((e); ) such that











































a = 0.8, B = 3, t = 3
Figure 2: When (1  a) decreases
on [0; kp]. As a result, there exist pooling equilibria with kp < kp such that Up(kp) Us(ks) > 0.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we examine a situation in which each worker endogenously determines the quality
of labor through a private investment decision, and the consequent asymmetric information in
the market in return causes a moral hazard problem in the investment stage. We consider a
model in which signaling is a natural option for workers and socially benecial due to its inu-
ence on the workersinvestment. We o¤er a theoretical foundation for the argument that there
are too many high-type workers from a welfare perspective. We identify circumstances under
which pooling signal reaches a saturation point such that it becomes su¢ ciently ine¤ective in
generating the investment ratio above a certain equilibrium level. In this case, it is socially
preferred to reduce signaling costs than to increase high-type workers, and separating equilib-
rium generates too many high-type workers while still having to use the incentive-compatible
signal to treat high-type workers di¤erently in the market. The ine¢ ciency of overinvestment
can be reduced only in pooling equilibrium where workers use the same signal without having
to be treated di¤erently. We also identify circumstances under which pooling signal remains











































a = 0.7, B = 2, t = 4
Figure 3: When  increases
generates too few high-type workers, and the ine¢ ciency of underinvestment can be reduced in
separating equilibrium.
Our ndings are based on a model that has fairly standard features. Thus, the main theme
of our model can be generally extended for the setting in which an investment decision endoge-
nously generates asymmetric information about the quality of products in the market, and this
asymmetric information in the market in return causes a moral hazard problem in the investment
stage.
7 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 4. In the benchmark model, a separating equilibrium (eL; eH) generates
the social welfare:
uH (yH ; eH) + (1  )uL (yL; 0) :
Since uH (yH ; eH) is strictly decreasing in eH 2 [eH ; eH ], the least costly signaling for type H,
eH , generates the highest social welfare in the separating equilibrium:
Us = uH (yH ; eH) + (1  )uL (yL; 0) :
A pooling equilibrium, eH = eL = e, generates the social welfare:
Up = uH

















E [y] ; 0

:
For a separating equilibrium, since uH (yH ; 0) > uH (yH ; eH), we have
uH (yH ; 0) + (1  )uL (yL; 0) > Us:
Thus, to verify the result U0 > Us, it su¢ ces to show that
uH





E [y] ; 0

  [uH (yH ; 0) + (1  )uL (yL; 0)]  0:
The LHS of this inequality becomes
[uH

E [y] ; 0

  uH (yH ; 0)] + (1  )[uL

E [y] ; 0

  uL (yL; 0)]
= [uL

E [y] ; 0

  uL (yH ; 0)] + (1  )[uL

E [y] ; 0

  uL (yL; 0)]
= uL

E [y] ; 0

  [uL (yH ; 0) + (1  )uL (yL; 0)]  0:
The rst equality follows from the assumption that the utility gain from any wage increase
is type-irrelevant, and the last inequality is given by concavity of uL in w. For a pooling
equilibrium, for any e > 0, it is immediate that U0 > Up.
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose rst that there exists  2 (0; 1) such that D (e ())  .
Dene a correspondence 	 : [0; 1] [0; 1] using (9) such that
	()  fx 2 [0; 1] : x = D (e) for e 2 [0; e ()]g.
Thus, an equilibrium fraction of typeH, , is a xed point of	,  2 	(). SinceD (e) 2 (0; 1)
is an increasing function of e, the correspondence can be rewritten as 	() = [0; D (e ())],





= D (e) = . Suppose next that there exists a pooling equilibrium and
D (e ()) <  for all  2 (0; 1). Then only a boundary pooling equilibrium with  = 0 or  = 1
exists, which causes a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 2. (i) Suppose (e(1)) > c. Since e () is an strictly increasing
function of  2 (0; 1), there exists a unique 0 < 1 such that   e(0) = c. This implies that
D (e()) = 1 and D (e()) >  for  2 [0; 1), and Proposition 1 implies the existence of a
pooling equilibrium with  su¢ ciently close to 1.
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(ii) If D (e (1)) 2 (0; 1) and there exists a su¢ ciently small 0 > 0 such that dD(e())=d > 0
is su¢ ciently small on [0; 1], then there exists  2 [0; 1) such that D (e ()) =  with 
su¢ ciently close to D(e(1)). If D(e(1)) = 1, dD(e())=d < 1 at  = 1 is su¢ cient to have a
pooling equilibrium with  su¢ ciently close to 1.
Proof of Lemma 5. Suppose that the government uses the regulation (E) such that a pair
(uH(yH ; E)  uL(yL; 0); E) satises (8) and is a separating equilibrium. If there is a separating
equilibrium with eH > E, then the equilibrium cannot satisfy the intuitive criterion: a high-type
worker can attain a higher payo¤ by deviating from the separating equilibrium, and a low-type





0 > uH (yH ; eH) and uL (yL; 0) > uL  yH ; e0 .
The former inequality follows from e0 < eH , and the latter is from uL (yL; 0) = uH (yH ; eH) >
uL (yH ; e
0) for e0 > E  eH .
Suppose next that the government uses the regulation (E) such that a pair (uH(0; E)  
uL(0; E); E) satises (9) and is a pooling equilibrium. Let bE satisfying uL(w; bE) = uL(yH ; E),
where w  yH + (1  ) yL is the poolings wage. Then, for each e 2 [ bE;E], we have
uL(w; e)  uL(w; bE) = uL(yH ; E)  uL(yH ; e0) for all e0  E. Hence, such e satises the
criterion, since there is no e0  E such that uL (w; e) > uL (yH ; e0). Now, we show that
there exists E such that any e 2 [E; bE) does not satisfy the criterion. Choose E satisfy-
ing uH(w;E) < uH(yH ; E). Suppose that there is a pooling equilibrium with such e. Then,
uL(w; e) > uL(w; bE) = uL(yH ; E), and uH(w; e)  uH(w;E) < uH(yH ; E). A type H worker
can attain a higher payo¤ by deviating from the pooling equilibrium to E, and a type L worker
cannot imitate the action of the type H worker. Hence, [E; bE)[fEg yields a unique equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 6. The result is immediate for a su¢ ciently small 0 (e) > 0. We thus
focus on the condition on g(kp). Let g(kp) = 0. Then, given 0 (e) = @uH=@e  @uL=@e,
























Hence, for a su¢ ciently small g(kp) > 0, U 0p (kp) < 0.
Proof of Proposition 3. (i) (e (1)) > c. From Proposition 1, there does not exist a
separating equilibrium with eH , but from Proposition 2 (i), there exists a pooling equilibrium
with  su¢ ciently close to 1. The poolings signal level e corresponding to the threshold c is
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given as c = (e), and (e (1)) > c = (e) implies e (1) > e. Recall the denition of e ()
such that uL(E [y] ; e ()) = uL (yL; 0) from (5). By e (1) > e, uL(E1 [y] ; e) > uL(E1 [y] ; e (1)) =
uL (yL; 0). Then,




= uL(E1 [y] ; e)  uL (yL; 0) > 0,
and Us (c) > Us for any feasible separatings social welfare Us. Hence, there exists kp su¢ ciently
close to c such that Up (kp) > Us for any feasible separatings social welfare Us. The result
follows from Lemma 5.
(ii) c < (e (1))  c. We divide the proof into two cases.
Case 1. (e (1)) = c. From Proposition 1, there does not exist a separating equilibrium
with eH . If D
0 (e) is su¢ ciently small at e with D (e) = 1, from Proposition 2 (ii), there exists
a pooling equilibrium with  su¢ ciently close to 1. The poolings signal level e corresponding
to the threshold c is given as c = (e), and (e (1)) = c = (e) implies e (1) = e. Then,




= uL(E1 [y] ; e)  uL (yL; 0) = 0,
and Us (c) > Us for any feasible separatings social welfare Us. If D0 (e) is su¢ ciently small
at e with D (e) = 1, from Lemma 6, Up (kp) is strictly decreasing at c. Hence, there exists kp
su¢ ciently close to c such that Up (kp) > Us for any feasible separatings social welfare Us. The
result follows from Lemma 5.
Case 2. c < (e (1)) < c. From Proposition 1, there exists a separating equilibrium with eH ,
which has a threshold ks = (e (1)). Denote the separatings human capital accumulation by
  G  ks. Now, if D0 (e) is su¢ ciently small on e : D (e) = ,  2 0; 1	, from Proposition
2 (ii), there exists a pooling equilibrium. In particular, choose a xed point  su¢ ciently close




= . It follows from D (e ()) =
 = D (e) that e () = e, and uL(E

[y] ; e) = uL(E
















  Us  ks ! 0. In addition, for a xed ks, as D0 (e) ! 0 for all e satisfying D(e)  ,
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from Lemma 6, Up (kp) is strictly decreasing at kp. Hence, there exists kp su¢ ciently close to kp
such that Up (kp) > Us for any feasible separatings social welfare Us. The result follows from
Lemma 5.
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